Attestation · obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
Object Attestation Record
Cross-cloud transfer · obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
SERVER GENERAL / TRANSFER GENERAL
tg-attest v1.8.0 · schema 1.8.0

The signed attestation record below is the authoritative cryptographic evidence for the transfer of one object between cloud providers.

artifact_type
canonical_attestation_payload
tg_object_id
obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
document_sha256
d4a8e2f1b6c9a3d7e0f2b4c6a8d1e3f5b7c9a2d4e6f8b1c3a5d7e9f0b2c4a6d8
generated_at
2026-04-15T14:22:11.487Z
Verification
[VERIFIED]·hash_match=true·signature=valid·fips=true·elapsed=8.395s
§ 1

canonical_payload

43 fields · rfc 8785 · signed

The signed payload, exactly as it appears in the WORM record. This is the authoritative artifact — everything else in this document derives from it. Annotations to the right are not part of the signed payload.

1{
2  "attestation_version": "TG-ATTESTATION-V1",Attestation envelope version
3  "schema_version": "1.8.0",Canonical payload schema version
4  "context_tag": "TG-ATTESTATION-V1",Concatenated into signing input to prevent cross-context signature reuse
5  "signature_sequence_number": 1,Monotonic per-object sequence (1 = first attestation)
6  "worm_record_uri": "worm://sg-attestation-store/attestations/obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e/1.json",Path to immutable WORM record backing this attestation
7  "tg_object_id": "obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e",Unique TG-assigned identifier for this object's transfer
8  "transfer_id": "tr_a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",Identifier for the transfer batch this object belongs to
9  "object_name": "study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Object name as it appeared in source
10  "source_path": "s3://meridian-phi-prod-us-east-1/imaging/2026-04-15/study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Full source URI: cloud://account/bucket/key
11  "destination_path": "gs://meridian-ai-training-us-central1/imaging-ingest/2026-04-15/study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Full destination URI: cloud://account/bucket/key
12  "source_hash_sha256": "8a4f0d2bb7c1e6f3a9d8b5c2f1e4a7d3c6b9f2a5e8d1b4c7f0a3d6e9b2c5f8a1",SHA-256 over plaintext at pipeline entry, before encryption
13  "destination_hash_sha256": "8a4f0d2bb7c1e6f3a9d8b5c2f1e4a7d3c6b9f2a5e8d1b4c7f0a3d6e9b2c5f8a1",SHA-256 computed inline during decryption at Landing — must equal source_hash_sha256
14  "hash_match": true,true when source and destination hashes match — gate that permits destination write
15  "data_encryption_algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",Authenticated cipher used to encrypt the object payload
16  "fips_compliant": true,true when all crypto in this transfer was FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant
17  "kms_encrypt_key_id": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:847362910543:key/c8d4f1a2-3b5e-4a7c-9d2e-6f1a8c3b5d7e",Customer KMS key used to wrap the DEK at source
18  "kms_encrypt_provider": "aws",Cloud provider holding the encrypt key
19  "kms_encrypt_algorithm": "AES-256 (DEK wrapping via SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT)",Algorithm used by KMS to wrap the DEK
20  "kms_encrypt_timestamp": "2026-04-15T14:22:03.118Z",When the encrypt KMS call returned
21  "kms_decrypt_key_id": "projects/meridian-ai-prod/locations/us-central1/keyRings/phi-ingest/cryptoKeys/dek-prod-2026",Customer KMS key used to unwrap the DEK at destination
22  "kms_decrypt_provider": "gcp",Cloud provider holding the decrypt key
23  "kms_decrypt_algorithm": "GOOGLE_SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION",Algorithm used by KMS to unwrap
24  "kms_decrypt_timestamp": "2026-04-15T14:22:09.847Z",When the decrypt KMS call returned
25  "transfer_started_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:03.092Z",Pipeline began processing this object
26  "transfer_completed_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:11.234Z",Destination write confirmed; signing ceremony begins
27  "accountability": {
28    "initiating_organization": "Meridian Health Network",Customer-declared organization name
29    "organization_id": "ORG-MHN-2024-PROD",Customer-declared organization identifier
30    "authorized_by": "[email protected]",Customer-declared deployment authorizer
31    "pipeline_name": "phi-imaging-aws-to-gcp-prod",Customer-declared pipeline name
32    "pipeline_id": "tg-pipeline-mhn-imaging-001",TG-assigned pipeline identifier
33    "deployment_date": "2026-03-20T11:14:22.000Z",When this pipeline was deployed
34    "tg_execution_identity": "arn:aws:iam::847362910543:role/tg-pipeline-execution-role",IAM identity TG executed under, from cloud metadata APIs at runtime
35    "cloud_context": {
36      "source": {
37        "provider": "aws",Source cloud provider
38        "account_id": "847362910543",Source cloud account
39        "region": "us-east-1"Source cloud region
40      },
41      "destination": {
42        "provider": "gcp",Destination cloud provider
43        "account_id": "meridian-ai-prod",Destination cloud account
44        "region": "us-central1"Destination cloud region
45      }
46    }
47  },
48  "ask_key_id": "projects/sg-attestation-prod/locations/global/keyRings/ask-prod-v1/cryptoKeys/ask-attestation-signer/cryptoKeyVersions/1",SG ASK key identifier (selected from 4 SG KMS instances by executing cloud + tier)
49  "ask_public_key_sha256": "4d3c2b1a9e8f7d6c5b4a3928170e6d5c4b3a2918e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c",SHA-256 fingerprint of the ASK public key — use for offline verification
50  "signing_algorithm": "ECDSA P-384 / SHA-256 / DER",Signature curve / hash / encoding format
51  "signed_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:11.487Z",When the SG KMS Sign call completed
52  "signature": "MEUCIQDx9mYq7K4n2pB8vW3jL5k7M2nR9sF8tHqGzL6vX2cYJgIgA1bC3dE4fG5hI6jK7lM8nO9pQ0rS1tU2vW3xY4zA5bC6dE7fG8hI9jK0lM1nO2pQ3rS4tU5vW6xY7zA8bC9dE0fG1hI2jK3lM4nO5pQ6rS7tU8vW9xY0zA1bC2dE3fG4hI5jK6lM7nO8pQ9rS0tU1vW2xY3zA4bC5dE6fG7hI8jK9lM0nO1pQ2rS3tU4vW5xY6zA7bC8dE9fG0hI1jK2lM3nO4pQ5rS6tU7vW8xY9z"DER-encoded ECDSA signature over the canonical payload
53}
§ 2

event_sequence

14 events · runtime trace

Time-ordered events observed by Transfer General during this object's transfer. Each event was written to an immutable store at the moment it occurred. Marker indicates events whose timestamps appear as fields in the canonical payload above.

01object_detected_in_source14:22:03.092Z
02 source_sha256_computation_begun14:22:03.094Z
03 source_sha256_finalized14:22:03.115Z
04kms_encrypt_returned14:22:03.118Z
05 staging_write_confirmed14:22:04.402Z
06 source_delete_confirmed14:22:04.587Z
07 landing_write_confirmed14:22:09.583Z
08 staging_delete_confirmed14:22:09.741Z
09kms_decrypt_returned14:22:09.847Z
10 destination_sha256_computed_inline14:22:10.892Z
11 hash_match_verified14:22:10.894Z
12destination_write_confirmed14:22:11.234Z
13 landing_delete_confirmed14:22:11.341Z
14attestation_signed14:22:11.487Z
Total elapsed under operational custody: 8.395s · denotes anchor events recorded in canonical_payload.
§ 3

verify_independently

2 levels · offline + csp-native

This attestation is verifiable by anyone in possession of the canonical payload, the signature, and the ASK public key — without contacting Server General.

level_1 · portable
Offline ECDSA verification

Reconstruct signing input from canonical_payload + schema_version + context_tag. Verify against the ASK public key.

# with openssl
$ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify ask_pub.pem \
    -signature attestation.sig \
    signing_input.bin

Verified OK
level_2 · authoritative
CSP-native KMS verify

Required for formal compliance proceedings. Calls the originating cloud KMS using ask_key_id. Returns a CSP-native verification receipt.

# this transfer signed by GCP instance
$ gcloud kms asymmetric-signature verify \
    --location=global \
    --keyring=ask-prod-v1 \
    --key=ask-attestation-signer \
    --version=1 \
    --signature-file=attestation.sig \
    --input-file=signing_input.bin

Verified.
§ 4

compliance_mapping

3 frameworks

How fields recorded in this attestation satisfy specific control requirements. Not legal advice; this is the explicit mapping from each framework's integrity-of-data-in-motion requirement to the evidence produced here.

HIPAA / HITECH
45 CFR § 164.312(c)(2)
"Implement electronic mechanisms to corroborate that ePHI has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner." This attestation is that mechanism.
SOC 2 (Type II)
CC6.1 · CC7.2 · CC8.1
Logical access (CC6.1) and detection of system processing exceptions (CC7.2). The hash comparison is the processing-integrity evidence.
FedRAMP / FISMA
NIST 800-53 SI-7 · AU-9(1)
Software / firmware / information integrity (SI-7) and protection of audit information (AU-9(1)). The attestation is integrity evidence; the WORM-backed store is protection.
Generated automatically by Transfer General v3.0 at transfer completion. One signed attestation per object. The canonical_payload is the authoritative artifact; this HTML is a viewer.
Server General Inc. · /chain-of-custody · contact
tg-attest v1.8.0
schema 1.8.0
ECDSA P-384 / SHA-256