Attestation · obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
Object Attestation Record
Cross-cloud transfer · obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
SERVER GENERAL / TRANSFER GENERAL
tg-attest v1.8.0 · schema 1.8.0

The signed attestation record below is the authoritative cryptographic evidence for the transfer of one object between cloud providers.

artifact_type
canonical_attestation_payload
tg_object_id
obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e
document_sha256
d4a8e2f1b6c9a3d7e0f2b4c6a8d1e3f5b7c9a2d4e6f8b1c3a5d7e9f0b2c4a6d8
generated_at
2026-04-15T14:22:11.487Z
Verification
[VERIFIED]·hash_match=true·signature=valid·fips=true·elapsed=8.395s
§ 1

canonical_payload

43 fields · rfc 8785 · signed

The signed payload, exactly as it appears in the WORM record. This is the authoritative artifact — everything else in this document derives from it. Annotations to the right are not part of the signed payload.

1{
2  "attestation_version": "TG-ATTESTATION-V1",Attestation envelope version
3  "schema_version": "1.8.0",Canonical payload schema version
4  "context_tag": "TG-ATTESTATION-V1",Concatenated into signing input to prevent cross-context signature reuse
5  "signature_sequence_number": 1,Monotonic per-object sequence (1 = first attestation)
6  "worm_record_uri": "worm://sg-attestation-store/attestations/obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e/1.json",Path to immutable WORM record backing this attestation
7  "tg_object_id": "obj_8f3a9c2e-7b1d-4f5a-9e8c-2d4b6a8f1c3e",Unique TG-assigned identifier for this object's transfer
8  "transfer_id": "tr_a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",Identifier for the transfer batch this object belongs to
9  "object_name": "study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Object name as it appeared in source
10  "source_path": "s3://meridian-phi-prod-us-east-1/imaging/2026-04-15/study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Full source URI: cloud://account/bucket/key
11  "destination_path": "gs://meridian-ai-training-us-central1/imaging-ingest/2026-04-15/study_2026-04-15_CT-CHEST_patient-redacted.dcm.bundle",Full destination URI: cloud://account/bucket/key
12  "source_hash_sha256": "8a4f0d2bb7c1e6f3a9d8b5c2f1e4a7d3c6b9f2a5e8d1b4c7f0a3d6e9b2c5f8a1",SHA-256 over plaintext at pipeline entry, before encryption
13  "destination_hash_sha256": "8a4f0d2bb7c1e6f3a9d8b5c2f1e4a7d3c6b9f2a5e8d1b4c7f0a3d6e9b2c5f8a1",SHA-256 computed inline during decryption at Landing — must equal source_hash_sha256
14  "hash_match": true,true when source and destination hashes match — gate that permits destination write
15  "data_encryption_algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",Authenticated cipher used to encrypt the object payload
16  "fips_compliant": true,true when all crypto in this transfer was FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant
17  "kms_encrypt_key_id": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:847362910543:key/c8d4f1a2-3b5e-4a7c-9d2e-6f1a8c3b5d7e",Customer KMS key used to wrap the DEK at source
18  "kms_encrypt_provider": "aws",Cloud provider holding the encrypt key
19  "kms_encrypt_algorithm": "AES-256 (DEK wrapping via SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT)",Algorithm used by KMS to wrap the DEK
20  "kms_encrypt_timestamp": "2026-04-15T14:22:03.118Z",When the encrypt KMS call returned
21  "kms_decrypt_key_id": "projects/meridian-ai-prod/locations/us-central1/keyRings/phi-ingest/cryptoKeys/dek-prod-2026",Customer KMS key used to unwrap the DEK at destination
22  "kms_decrypt_provider": "gcp",Cloud provider holding the decrypt key
23  "kms_decrypt_algorithm": "GOOGLE_SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION",Algorithm used by KMS to unwrap
24  "kms_decrypt_timestamp": "2026-04-15T14:22:09.847Z",When the decrypt KMS call returned
25  "transfer_started_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:03.092Z",Pipeline began processing this object
26  "transfer_completed_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:11.234Z",Destination write confirmed; signing ceremony begins
27  "accountability": {
28    "initiating_organization": "Meridian Health Network",Customer-declared organization name
29    "organization_id": "ORG-MHN-2024-PROD",Customer-declared organization identifier
30    "authorized_by": "[email protected]",Customer-declared deployment authorizer
31    "pipeline_name": "phi-imaging-aws-to-gcp-prod",Customer-declared pipeline name
32    "pipeline_id": "tg-pipeline-mhn-imaging-001",TG-assigned pipeline identifier
33    "deployment_date": "2026-03-20T11:14:22.000Z",When this pipeline was deployed
34    "tg_execution_identity": "arn:aws:iam::847362910543:role/tg-pipeline-execution-role",IAM identity TG executed under, from cloud metadata APIs at runtime
35    "cloud_context": {
36      "source": {
37        "provider": "aws",Source cloud provider
38        "account_id": "847362910543",Source cloud account
39        "region": "us-east-1"Source cloud region
40      },
41      "destination": {
42        "provider": "gcp",Destination cloud provider
43        "account_id": "meridian-ai-prod",Destination cloud account
44        "region": "us-central1"Destination cloud region
45      }
46    }
47  },
48  "ask_key_id": "projects/sg-attestation-prod/locations/global/keyRings/ask-prod-v1/cryptoKeys/ask-attestation-signer/cryptoKeyVersions/1",SG ASK key identifier (selected from 4 SG KMS instances by executing cloud + tier)
49  "ask_public_key_sha256": "4d3c2b1a9e8f7d6c5b4a3928170e6d5c4b3a2918e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c",SHA-256 fingerprint of the ASK public key — use for offline verification
50  "signing_algorithm": "ECDSA P-384 / SHA-256 / DER",Signature curve / hash / encoding format
51  "signed_at": "2026-04-15T14:22:11.487Z",When the SG KMS Sign call completed
52  "signature": "MEUCIQDx9mYq7K4n2pB8vW3jL5k7M2nR9sF8tHqGzL6vX2cYJgIgA1bC3dE4fG5hI6jK7lM8nO9pQ0rS1tU2vW3xY4zA5bC6dE7fG8hI9jK0lM1nO2pQ3rS4tU5vW6xY7zA8bC9dE0fG1hI2jK3lM4nO5pQ6rS7tU8vW9xY0zA1bC2dE3fG4hI5jK6lM7nO8pQ9rS0tU1vW2xY3zA4bC5dE6fG7hI8jK9lM0nO1pQ2rS3tU4vW5xY6zA7bC8dE9fG0hI1jK2lM3nO4pQ5rS6tU7vW8xY9z"DER-encoded ECDSA signature over the canonical payload
53}
§ 2

event_sequence

14 events · runtime trace

Time-ordered events observed by Transfer General during this object's transfer. Each event was written to an immutable store at the moment it occurred. Marker ▸ indicates events whose timestamps appear as fields in the canonical payload above.

01▸object_detected_in_source14:22:03.092Z
02 source_sha256_computation_begun14:22:03.094Z
03 source_sha256_finalized14:22:03.115Z
04▸kms_encrypt_returned14:22:03.118Z
05 staging_write_confirmed14:22:04.402Z
06 source_delete_confirmed14:22:04.587Z
07 landing_write_confirmed14:22:09.583Z
08 staging_delete_confirmed14:22:09.741Z
09▸kms_decrypt_returned14:22:09.847Z
10 destination_sha256_computed_inline14:22:10.892Z
11 hash_match_verified14:22:10.894Z
12▸destination_write_confirmed14:22:11.234Z
13 landing_delete_confirmed14:22:11.341Z
14▸attestation_signed14:22:11.487Z
Total elapsed under operational custody: 8.395s · ▸ denotes anchor events recorded in canonical_payload.
§ 3

verify_independently

2 levels · offline + csp-native

This attestation is verifiable by anyone in possession of the canonical payload, the signature, and the ASK public key — without contacting Server General.

level_1 · portable
Offline ECDSA verification

Reconstruct signing input from canonical_payload + schema_version + context_tag. Verify against the ASK public key.

# with openssl
$ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify ask_pub.pem \
    -signature attestation.sig \
    signing_input.bin

Verified OK
level_2 · authoritative
CSP-native KMS verify

Required for formal compliance proceedings. Calls the originating cloud KMS using ask_key_id. Returns a CSP-native verification receipt.

# this transfer signed by GCP instance
$ gcloud kms asymmetric-signature verify \
    --location=global \
    --keyring=ask-prod-v1 \
    --key=ask-attestation-signer \
    --version=1 \
    --signature-file=attestation.sig \
    --input-file=signing_input.bin

Verified.
§ 4

compliance_mapping

3 frameworks

How fields recorded in this attestation satisfy specific control requirements. Not legal advice; this is the explicit mapping from each framework's integrity-of-data-in-motion requirement to the evidence produced here.

HIPAA / HITECH
45 CFR § 164.312(c)(2)
"Implement electronic mechanisms to corroborate that ePHI has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner." This attestation is that mechanism.
SOC 2 (Type II)
CC6.1 · CC7.2 · CC8.1
Logical access (CC6.1) and detection of system processing exceptions (CC7.2). The hash comparison is the processing-integrity evidence.
FedRAMP / FISMA
NIST 800-53 SI-7 · AU-9(1)
Software / firmware / information integrity (SI-7) and protection of audit information (AU-9(1)). The attestation is integrity evidence; the WORM-backed store is protection.
Generated automatically by Transfer General v3.0 at transfer completion. One signed attestation per object. The canonical_payload is the authoritative artifact; this HTML is a viewer.
Server General Inc. · /chain-of-custody · contact
tg-attest v1.8.0
schema 1.8.0
ECDSA P-384 / SHA-256